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COMMENTS
KELSEY SMITH ACT: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
WARRANTLESS SEIZURE OF CELL PHONE
LOCATIONAL INFORMATION IN
EMERGENCY SITUATIONS
By: Maxwell B. Brown
ABSTRACT
The Kelsey Smith Act mandates cell phone carriers to release loca-
tional information of their subscribers to law enforcement officials in
emergency situations in the absence of a warrant.  Further, the Act
releases said carriers from liability when the aforementioned requests
are made.  Currently, nine states have enacted the Kelsey Smith Act.
Prior to the existence of the Act, the carriers were required to make a
good faith assessment of the emergency as well as the subsequent re-
quest by law enforcement officials.  The Kelsey Smith Act is an at-
tempt to create a more efficient means of accommodating the
operational needs of law enforcement in times of emergency without
improperly infringing on individuals’ privacy rights.
This Comment aims to analyze the implications associated with the
enacted legislation of the states that have adopted versions of the Kel-
sey Smith Act.  More specifically, this Comment will examine
whether privacy concerns are proper in light of the Act or whether
they are without merit.  In doing so, this Comment will provide rele-
vant historical and background information associated with elec-
tronic communication; an examination of the most recent arguments
disfavoring the Act; and a discussion of whether the operational
needs of law enforcement have been properly balanced with cell
phone service subscribers’ individual privacy rights as provided by
the United States Constitution.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On June 2, 2007, Kelsey Smith was abducted in a department store
parking lot in Overland Park, Kansas.1  In an effort to locate the miss-
ing teenage girl, local law enforcement officials contacted Kelsey’s
wireless provider to obtain locational data associated with her cell
phone.2  Due to resistance by the wireless provider to disclose the in-
formation in the absence of a warrant, it took three days before the
officers were able to retrieve the locational information.3  Only forty-
five minutes after receiving the information, police detectives were
able to locate Kelsey’s body using a “cell phone ping.”4  Kelsey was
only eighteen years old at the time of her death.5
The abduction and murder of Kelsey Smith attracted substantial
media coverage.  Further, controversy arose as to what took law en-
forcement officials so long to retrieve the locational information from
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her cell phone.6  In response to her death and the delayed receipt of
Kelsey’s cell phone records, Kelsey’s parents proposed the Kelsey
Smith Act, and it was signed into Kansas law on April 17, 2009.7  To-
day, versions of the law have been adopted by nine states: Kansas,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Hawaii, Tennessee, Min-
nesota, Missouri, and Utah.8
Prior to the development of the Kelsey Smith Act, law enforcement
officials were required to obtain a warrant to receive cell phone
records from wireless providers.  In contrast, the Act requires tele-
communications carries and commercial mobile service providers to
release the location information of their users to local law enforce-
ment officials without a warrant in emergency situations involving
death or serious bodily injury.9  Additionally, the Act protects carriers
and service providers from being sued in any court of law for provid-
ing the aforementioned information to law enforcement officials.10
Proponents of the Act believe it creates a more time-efficient
method to obtain vital information in emergency situations and could
ultimately save lives.11  Conversely, opponents question the Act’s con-
stitutionality.12  For example, a lawsuit was recently filed in Missouri,
the most recent state to enact the legislation, under the premise that
the Act violates the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitu-
tion.13  More specifically, the complaint alleged that the law frustrates
Congress’s intent to provide a uniform system of privacy rights under
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 and prevents cell
phone subscribers from bringing civil action against cell phone carri-
ers, which directly conflicts with an individual’s right to bring such an
action under federal law.14
This Comment aims to analyze the implications associated with the
enacted legislation of the states that have adopted versions of the Kel-
sey Smith Act.  The first part of the Comment will provide relevant
technological and historical background information involved with
6. See Abby Simons, Parents of Murdered Kansas Teen Lobby for Cell Phone
‘Ping’ Law, STARTRIBUNE, Feb. 18, 2010, available at http://www.startribune.com/
politics/statelocal/84750807.html.
7. Tresniowski, supra note 1, at 73.
8. Cristina Corbin, Mother of murdered teen pushes for law forcing cellphone car-
riers to release life-saving information, FOX NEWS (Apr. 13, 2013), http://www.fox
news.com/politics/2013/04/13/mother-murdered-teen-pushes-for-law-mandating-cell-
phone-carriers-to-release/.
9. H.B. 1108, 96th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2012).
10. Id.
11. See Corbin, supra note 8.
12. See William Browning, Missouri Law Firm Challenges New Kelsey’s Law YA-
HOO! NEWS (Aug. 29, 2012), http://news.yahoo.com/missouri-law-firm-challenges-
kelsey-law-173200050.html.
13. See Verified Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief, Hop-
wood v. Missouri, No. 12-CV-04238 (W.D. Mo. 2012) [hereinafter Hopwood
Complaint].
14. Id.
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tracking and surveillance technology.  First, an overview of the tech-
nology that is currently being used to locate wireless devices will be
provided.  Next, historical background detailing the constitutional and
statutory foundation leading up to the Kelsey Smith Act will be
discussed.
The second part of this Comment will examine the Kelsey Smith
Act, focusing on the constitutional issues that may be raised in opposi-
tion to the Act.  First, the Comment will look at the constitutionality
of the Act in light of the lawsuit that was recently filed in Missouri.
More specifically, the first section of the second part will attempt to
determine whether the Kelsey Smith Act is preempted by the Elec-
tronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 and is thus unconstitu-
tional under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.
Next, the existence of other constitutional issues associated with the
Act will be discussed.
Finally, the third part of this Comment will discuss why more states
should ultimately adopt versions of the Kelsey Smith Act.  This Part
will address the various policy considerations of both proponents and
opponents of the Act.  Specifically, the policy considerations will be
balanced to determine that the benefits of the Kelsey Smith Act out-
weigh the privacy concerns raised by those opposed to the Act.
II. TECHNOLOGICAL AND STATUTORY BACKGROUND
A. Surveillance Technology Used by Law Enforcement Officials
In accordance with expansive technological developments, the
methods used by law enforcement for tracking and surveillance have
evolved through the years.  For example, Kelsey Smith’s body was
found through law enforcement’s utilization of her cell phone
records.15  Upon receipt of the records, a technician was able to
pinpoint a transmission tower and directed investigators to search 1.1
miles north of the tower.16  In approximately forty-five minutes Kel-
sey’s body was successfully located.17
However, the technology used to locate Kelsey’s body is not with-
out contest.  The increasingly pervasive methods used for tracking and
surveillance raise a number of concerns, including infringement on in-
dividual privacy rights.18  Further, on numerous occasions, legislation
15. Vicky Newman, New Law Will Help in Missing Person Cases, NEWS-HERALD
(Apr. 17, 2012, 8:43 AM), http://www.news-herald.net/story/13739.
16. Kelsey Smith Cell Phone Records, CELL PHONE SERVS., https://sites.google.
com/site/cellsphonesservices/my-forms (last visited Feb. 19, 2013).
17. Mike Lear, Bill Would Require ‘Pings’ of Missing Persons’ Cell Phones, MIS-
SOURINET (Feb. 3, 2012), http://www.missourinet.com/2012/02/03/bill-would-require-
pings-of-missing-persons-cell-phones/.
18. Catherine Crump, Location Tracking After United States v. Jones: Continued
Uncertainty Harms Americans’ Privacy, TELECOMMUNICATIONS MONITOR (Aug. 8,
2012).
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has changed to accommodate law enforcement’s use of new technol-
ogy.  Accordingly, it is important to understand the history and devel-
opment of the currently-used technology to analyze the issues that
their use subsequently raises.
1. Radio Communication
For decades, law enforcement officials have been utilizing various
forms of surveillance technology to facilitate searches of suspects and
victims involved in criminal investigations.19  Initially, Congress de-
fined “electronic tracking devices” as “one-way radio communication
devices that emit a signal on a specific radio frequency.”20  In essence,
the device defined by Congress was a beeper.21
The courts defined a beeper as, “a radio transmitter, usually battery
operated, which emits periodic signals that can be picked up by a ra-
dio receiver.”22  The “beeper” emitted signals to a radio receiver,
which would beep at various speeds based on movement.23  The
“beeper” technology was used by law enforcement for many years;
however, it eventually became obsolete due to the emergence of satel-
lite-based tracking devices.24
2. Global Positioning System
Generally, satellite-based tracking devices involve GPS technol-
ogy.25  Initially developed for military use, GPS technology triangu-
lates satellite signals to locate a specific target.26  That is, continuous
emissions of various frequencies are sent to multiple satellites in order
to determine the latitude and longitude of the target GPS receiver.27
In order to determine the specific location of a particular receiver, the
locations of at least three satellites and the receiver’s location in rela-
tion to those satellites must be identified.28  After determining this
information, the receiver basically draws a sphere around the three
satellites that were located.29  The three spheres intersect at two
points, and the point of intersection is the exact location of the GPS
receiver.30  This process is commonly referred to as “trilateration.”31
19. See generally Stephen B. Wicker, Cellular Telephony and the Question of Pri-
vacy, 54 COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM, no. 1, July 2011, at 88.
20. S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 10 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3564.





26. Marshall Brain & Tom Harris, How GPS Receivers Work, HOWSTUFFWORKS,
http://electronics.howstuffworks.com/gadgets/travel/gps.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2013).
27. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 277.
28. See Tracy V. Wilson, How GPS Phones Work, HOWSTUFFWORKS, http://
electronics.howstuffworks.com/gps-phone.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2013).
29. Id.
30. Id.
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Today, most mobile phones contain GPS receivers and are capable
of receiving signals from GPS satellites.32  Accordingly, wireless carri-
ers are usually able to accurately locate a specific device’s location
through the use of GPS trilateration.33  For example, the United
States Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) enacted a pro-
gram called “enhanced 911” (“E911”) requiring that all cell phones
transmit its phone number and location when dialing 911.34  Under
the E911 program, the user’s location is determined through utilizing
the GPS technology that has been installed on almost all modern-day
cell phones.35  Thus, in essence, law enforcement officials have the po-
tential ability to compel wireless carriers to disclose the locational in-
formation of specific cell phone users for investigative purposes.
Similarly, wireless phone providers have access to records that are
produced using cell-site location information.
3. Overview of Cell-Site Location Information
Cell-site tracking identifies the location of a wireless phone by pin-
pointing the specific cellular transmission towers that the phone is us-
ing.36  Regardless of whether the cell phone is currently being used, it
continuously sends signals, commonly known as “pings,” to the near-
est transmission tower and mobile switching center while the cell
phone is turned on.37  Upon receipt of locational data, the mobile
switching center is able to route incoming calls and messages to the
nearest transmission tower.38
Additionally, wireless providers maintain detailed records of the
data produced, primarily for the purposes of diagnostics and billing.39
The records contain the calls that were made and received by wireless
users and information regarding the specific transmission towers that
were used.40  Thus, wireless providers are able to track individual car-
riers based on the “pings” received by the switching center and en-
tered into the customer’s cell-site record.41
Similar to GPS, the data that accumulates from multiple transmis-






36. Lewis R. Katz, Right of Privacy—E-mail, Instant Messaging, and Cell Phones,
BALDWIN’S OHIO HANDBOOK SERIES OHIO ARREST, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 1:17
(2012).
37. MARTIN A. DOLAN, ET AL., CHICAGO BAR ASSOCIATION, USE OF CELL
PHONE RECORDS AND GPS TRACKING, 24 CBA REC. at 38, 39 (Jan. 2010).
38. Id.
39. See Declan McCullagh, Feds Push for Tracking Cell Phones, CNET NEWS
(Feb. 11, 2010), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-10451518-38.html.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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specific wireless phone user.42  As described in the Kelsey Smith in-
vestigation, this method of tracking is capable of producing extremely
accurate results.43  Accordingly, its use by law enforcement during in-
vestigations is becoming increasingly more prevalent; as a result, legis-
latures are proposing and enacting laws to facilitate more efficient
uses of the technology.
B. Constitutional and Statutory Foundation of
Surveillance Technology
As technology’s prevalence in our lives steadily increases with rapid
new developments, the law too must increasingly develop to accom-
modate the issues that are raised as a result; however, it seems the
former often outruns the latter.  Since the development of radio fre-
quency “beepers,” police surveillance and tracking procedures have
been subject to debate.  Frequently, questions arise as to what is rea-
sonable and what constitutes an invasion of privacy.  Accordingly,
states have adopted various statutes and regulations throughout the
years in an attempt to clarify the acceptable methods and devices law
enforcement officials may use during police investigations.44
1. Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects
against “unreasonable searches and seizures” and states that warrants
should not be issued “but upon probable cause.”45  Of course, the
Amendment’s language does not address telephone or electronic com-
munication.46  Thus, legal protection of telephone and electronic com-
munication has been primarily based on judicial interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment.
In 1928, the United States Supreme Court made the first significant
telecommunications-surveillance decision in Olmstead v. United
States,47 a case involving wiretapping.48  The Court held that police
wiretapping did not constitute “search and seizure” because “evidence
was secured by use of the sense of hearing and that only. There was no
entry of the houses or offices of the defendants.”49  At this point, it is
apparent that the Court maintained a narrow textual interpretation of
42. See generally ECPA Reform and the Revolution in Location Based Technolo-
gies and Services: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights,
and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 81-85, 93-94 (2010).
43. See Kelsey Smith Cell Phone Records, CELL PHONE SERVS., https://sites.google
.com/site/cellsphonesservices/my-forms (last visited Feb. 19, 2013).
44. See H.B. 1108, 96th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2012); 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2510–2522,  2701–2712,  3121–3127 (2002).
45. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
46. Wicker, supra note 19, at 89.
47. See generally Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
48. Wicker, supra note 19, at 89.
49. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 464.
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the Fourth Amendment, unwilling to depart from actual searches and
seizures of tangible property. However, the holding in Olmstead was
directly overturned by Katz v. United States in 1967.50
a. Katz v. United States: Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
In Katz, the Court held that tapping phone calls from a phone
booth required a police warrant because the Fourth Amendment pro-
tects “people, not places.”51  Further, Justice Harlan established a
two-part test in his concurring opinion to determine whether the
Fourth Amendment is applicable.52  According to Harlan, the person
must have: (1) “an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy” and (2)
the expectation must be one that “society is prepared to recognize as
‘reasonable’.”53  Significantly, Katz was the first instance where the
Court applied the Fourth Amendment to telephone calls.54
b. Smith v. Maryland: Legitimate Business Purpose
In 1979 the court applied the Katz test in Smith v. Maryland.55  In
Smith, at the request of investigators, a telephone company installed a
pen register, a device used to record the numbers dialed on a specific
telephone line, at Smith’s home and office.56  The Court held that the
pen register did not violate Smith’s Fourth Amendment rights because
“it is doubtful that telephone users in general have any expectation of
privacy regarding the numbers they dial.”57
The Court further explained that telephone users generally know
that “they must convey phone numbers to the telephone company and
that the company has facilities for recording this information and does
in fact record it for various legitimate business purposes.”58  Ulti-
mately, the Court distinguished the privacy rights associated with the
content of telephone calls from those relating to the context of tele-
phone calls.59  Subsequently, this distinction was further defined when
Congress passed the Electronic Communication Privacy Act of 1986.60
2. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (“ECPA”)
The ECPA was enacted as a means of updating the Federal Wiretap
Act of 1968, which only applied to the interception of conversations
50. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
51. Id. at 351.
52. Id. at 361.
53. Id.
54. Wicker, supra note 19, at 90.
55. See generally Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
56. Id. at 737.
57. Id. at 735.
58. Id.
59. Wicker, supra note 19, at 91.
60. Id.
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made over actual telephone lines.61  In regards to electronic surveil-
lance, the ECPA regulates three separate titles of surveillance.62  Title
I, also known as the Wire Tap Act (“WTA”), concerns the intercep-
tion of wire, electronic, and oral communications.63  Title II, also
known as the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”), concerns govern-
ment access to “stored wire and electronic communications and trans-
actional records.”64  Finally, Title III concerns “pen registers and trap
and trace devices.”65
Further, there is much debate as to which of the three titles governs
the information compiled by wireless providers.66  Deciding which of
the three titles governs is important because “it determines the legal
burdens that law enforcement must overcome to obtain the data.”67
For example, Title I generally requires a warrant for the disclosure of
the content, whereas Title II allows law enforcement to obtain infor-
mation by providing “specific and articulable facts” showing that the
information is “relevant to an ongoing investigation,” a significantly
lower standard.68  Moreover, Title III provides minimal legal protec-
tion.  Title III requires only “that an attorney for the government cer-
tify that the information to be obtained is relevant to an ongoing
criminal investigation.”69
Additionally, this determination is in the end based on the type of
information that is sought by law enforcement officials, that is,
whether the information is historic cell-site location data or whether it
is real-time cell-site location data.70  Cell-site data is ordinarily classi-
fied as either historic or real-time data.71  Historic cell-site location
data records consist of a list of the wireless subscriber’s prior contact
with various cellular transmission towers.72  In contrast, real-time cell-
site location data, also known as prospective cell-site data, includes a
continuous update of all the cellular towers contacted by a subscriber
in “real-time.”73  The distinction between the two types of cell-site lo-
cation data is important in that it determines the appropriate burden
that courts will apply to law enforcement officials when attempting to
obtain the information during an investigation.74  Ultimately, this de-
61. U.S. Department of Justice, Privacy and Civil Liberties, http://www.it.ojp.gov/
default.aspx?area=privacy &page=1285 (last updated Mar. 21, 2012).
62. See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522, 2701–2712, 3121–3127 (2006).
63. Id. §§ 2510–2522 (2002).
64. Id. §§ 2701–2712.
65. Id. §§ 3121–3127.
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termination depends on whether the courts consider cell phones to be
tracking devices under the ECPA.75
a. Historic Cell-Site Data
Title II of the ECPA “protects the privacy of the contents of files
stored by service providers and of records held about the subscriber
by service providers, such as subscriber name, billing records, or IP
addresses.”76  Further, Title II generally covers historic cell-site data;
that is, a list of the cell-sites or transmission towers visited by a partic-
ular wireless service subscriber.77  As stated above, in obtaining this
information, Title II requires law enforcement to provide “specific
and articulable facts,” and they must show that the information
needed is “relevant and material to an ongoing investigation.”78  Thus,
the burden for acquiring historic cell-site information is lower than the
probable cause requirement for a warrant as described in Title I.
b. Real-Time Cell-Site Data
The majority of courts have found that real-time cell-site data does
not constitute a “record” because it is not stored communication.79
These courts compared real-time data to the numbers dialed by the
cell phone user, concluding that Title III of the ECPA should govern
real-time data.80  As stated above, under Title III it is only required
that “an attorney for the government certify that the information col-
lected is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation.”81  In contrast,
the minority of courts consider real-time data a record under the
ECPA.82  Under the minority view, although real-time data is continu-
ous, the wireless service providers still record the information prior to
delivering it to law enforcement officials.83  Thus, the minority view
considers a cellphone a tracking device that therefore should require a
showing of probable cause to access real-time cell-site data.84  The de-
bate over whether a standard less than probable cause is appropriate
when attempting to obtain real-time data is ongoing.
75. See id.
76. U.S. Department of Justice, supra note 61; 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712.
77. See In re Applications, 509 F. Supp. 2d 76 (D. Mass. 2007); In re Application,
2007 WL 3036849 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 17, 2007).
78. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d).
79. See In re Application for Pen Register and Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site
Location Authority, 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 760 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
80. Wicker, supra note 19, at 91.
81. Id.
82. See, e.g., In re Application of the United States for an Order for Disclosure of
Telecomms. Records & Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register & Trap & Trace, 405 F.
Supp. 2d 435, 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
83. Id.
84. Wicker, supra note 19, at 91.
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III. THE KELSEY SMITH ACT
Despite the relevant statutory foundation, the Kelsey Smith Act
mandates wireless service providers to provide location-based data to
law enforcement officials in emergency situations that involve the risk
of death or serious bodily injury.85  Specifically, the Act states:
Upon request, a telecommunications carrier or commercial mobile
service provider as identified in 47 U.S.C. Section 332(d)(1) and 47
CFR Parts 22 or 24 shall provide call location information concern-
ing the user of a telecommunications service or a wireless communi-
cations service, in an emergency situation to a law enforcement
official or agency in order to respond to a call for emergency service
by a subscriber, customer, or user of such service, or to provide
caller location information (or do a ping locate) in an emergency
situation that involves danger of death or serious physical injury to
any person where disclosure of communications relating to the
emergency is required without delay.86
The Act further states:
No cause of action shall lie in any court of law against any telecom-
munications carrier or telecommunications service or commercial
mobile service provider, or against any telecommunications service
or wireless communications service, or its officers, employees,
agents, or other specified persons, for providing any information,
facilities, or assistance to a law enforcement official or agency in
accordance with the terms of this section.  Notwithstanding any
other provision of law, nothing in this section prohibits a telecom-
munications carrier or commercial mobile service provider from es-
tablishing protocols by which such carrier or provider could
voluntarily disclose call location information.87
Thus, the Act ultimately provides an exception to the burdens im-
posed by ECPA in times of emergency.88  However, the exception
provided by the Act is not without contest, as seen by a recent Mis-
souri complaint alleging that the Act is unconstitutional.89
A. Is the Kelsey Smith Act Constitutional?
Recently, a lawsuit was filed in Missouri, the most recent state to
adopt the Act, alleging that the Act is unconstitutional.90  Subse-
quently, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the suit.  However, as more
and more states continue to enact similar amendments to the ECPA,
an analysis of the plaintiff’s original complaint will provide valuable
insight to the various constitutional issues possibly raised in opposi-




89. Hopwood Complaint, supra note 13.
90. Id.
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tion to similar Acts in the future.  Specifically, the complaint alleged
that the Act violates the Supremacy Clause of the United States Con-
stitution.91  The Supremacy Clause provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the su-
preme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound
thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the con-
trary notwithstanding.92
Further, “the Supremacy Clause prohibits state laws that conflict with
federal law where congress has expressed an intent to regulate.”93
Thus, it was the plaintiff’s contention in the Missouri suit that the Kel-
sey Smith Act conflicted with the ECPA and was therefore
preempted.94
1. Is the Kelsey Smith Act Preempted by the ECPA?
A state law is preempted by federal law when the federal govern-
ment has exercised its power to regulate, and there is either (1) a con-
flict or (2) a potential conflict between the federal law and the state
law.95  Further, there are two types of preemption: express preemp-
tion and implied preemption.96  Express preemption occurs when pre-
emptive statutory language is found; in other words, a federal statute
explicitly confirms Congress’s intent to preempt state law.97  Here, the
ECPA does not appear to explicitly confirm the intent to preempt
state laws concerning the privacy and disclosure of electronic and tele-
communications records in emergency situations.  Thus, the Court
probably would not have found that the Kelsey Smith Act expressly
preempted by the ECPA.98  However, the court may still find implied
preemption in the absence of express preemption when there is either
(a) conflict preemption or (b) field preemption.99
a. Is There Conflict Preemption Between the Kelsey Smith Act
and the ECPA?
A conflict is present when a party is unable to comply with both the
state and federal laws in question.100  Further, even if an actual con-
flict does not exist, a conflict may be arise if the state law creates an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
91. Id.
92. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
93. Hopwood Complaint, supra note 13.
94. Id.
95. See Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 89 (1992).
96. Id. at 98.
97. English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990).
98. See H.B. 1108, 96th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2012).
99. Gade, 505 U.S. at 89.
100. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 (1963).
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objectives of Congress.101  Thus, had the Missouri plaintiff not volun-
tarily dismissed the claim, she would have had to show one of two
things for her claim to succeed: (1) compliance with both the ECPA
and the Kelsey Smith Act was physically impossible; or (2) the Kelsey
Smith Act stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution
of the full purposes and objectives of Congress in enacting the
ECPA.102
In regards to the existence of an actual conflict, the plaintiff claimed
the Kelsey Smith Act “makes it impossible for a phone company/pro-
vider to comply with the federal act, which states they may disclose
records and location information, and the state law, which states they
must disclose the information.”103  Further, under 18 U.S.C.A. § 2702
of the ECPA, a telephone provider is given “discretion to provide the
‘contents of a communication’ to a governmental entity, if the pro-
vider, in good faith, believes that an emergency involving danger of
death or serious physical injury to any person requires disclosure with-
out delay of communications relating to the emergency.”104  Whereas,
the Kelsey Smith Act states, upon request by law enforcement, a tele-
phone provider “shall” provide such information in situations involv-
ing an emergency situation that “involves danger of death or serious
physical injury to any person.”105  Thus, the plaintiff contended the
Act eliminated any discretion given to the telecommunications pro-
vider in emergency situations by eradicating the ability of the provider
to make a good faith evaluation of the request by law enforcement as
provided by the ECPA.106
Although the plaintiff alleged that the Act eliminated all discretion
granted to telephone providers, after examining both regulations, this
allegation does not appear to be accurate.  For example, if an emer-
gency situation does indeed exist but law enforcement does not make
a request for locational information pertaining to the situation, the
telephone company appears to retain discretion to voluntarily disclose
such information to law enforcement.107  Thus, the Kelsey Smith Act
does not seem to eliminate any discretion to telephone providers as
the plaintiff proposed; in actuality the Act only eliminates discretion
in those situations where officers make a request for the information.
Nonetheless, it logically follows that in an emergency situation, where
a law enforcement official does indeed make a request upon the pro-
vider for locational information, compliance with both the Kelsey
Smith Act and section 2702 of the ECPA would probably be physically
101. Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372–73 (2000).
102. See Gade, 505 U.S. at 89.
103. Hopwood Complaint, supra note 13 [emphasis added].
104. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2702 (2012).
105. H.B. 1108, 96th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2012).
106. Hopwood Complaint, supra note 13.
107. See H.B. 1108, 96th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2012).
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impossible.  Moreover, section 2702 deals with voluntary disclosures
by providers not requests for disclosure by law enforcement officials,
and the Kelsey Smith Act explicitly states: “Nothing in this section
prohibits a telecommunications carrier or commercial mobile service
provider from establishing protocols by which such carrier or provider
could voluntarily disclose call location information.”108  Thus, the
plaintiff probably did not have a claim that an actual conflict exists
between the Kelsey Smith Act and the ECPA.
Additionally, in regards to creating an obstacle to Congress’s pur-
poses and objectives, the plaintiff contended that the Kelsey Smith
Act “frustrates what seems to be the evident congressional intention
to establish a uniform federal regime controlling when telecommuni-
cations records are disclosed and by whom.”109  Further, the plaintiff’s
complaint stated the Act “frustrates the clear congressional intention
to give a citizen the right to a civil action for violation of the privacy of
their phone records.”110  However, while it seems Congress did intend
to create these two purposes in enacting the ECPA, it does not appear
that they are necessarily frustrated by the Kelsey Smith Act as the
plaintiff proposed.  Rather, the Kelsey Smith Act may actually be in-
terpreted to complement the ECPA.
Both the ECPA and the Kelsey Smith Act grant warrantless seizure
of telephone records in emergency situations involving death or seri-
ous injury.111  The purpose of both section 2702 of the ECPA and the
Kelsey Smith Act appears to be creating a quick and effective means
of providing law enforcement with helpful information in life-threat-
ening situations.  However, in order to increase efficiency in emer-
gency situations, the Kelsey Smith Act transfers discretion from
telephone providers to law enforcement officials when a request is
made.112  For example, after Kelsey had been abducted, it took her
cell phone provider several days to release the locational information
that ultimately led law enforcement to her body.113  Conversely, had
there been a law in effect in Kansas similar to the Kelsey Smith Act,
law enforcement would have been able to gain access to the locational
information immediately, decreasing the amount of time it would
have taken to locate her body.
Further, the delay that occurred in providing law enforcement with
Kelsey’s cell phone records was most likely the result of the phone
company attempting to make a good faith evaluation of the situation
to confirm the existence of an “emergency” as defined by the ECPA.
108. Id.
109. Hopwood Complaint, supra note 13.
110. Id.
111. See H.B. 1108, 96th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2012); 18 U.S.C. § 2702
(2012).
112. See H.B. 1108, 96th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2012).
113. Tresniowski, supra note 1, at 73.
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In doing so, the provider was probably ensuring that they would not
be held liable for releasing the information without a warrant.  Be-
cause the Kelsey Smith Act ultimately eliminates the telephone prov-
iders’ good faith evaluation in these situations, it is necessary that the
providers be protected from suit as a matter of fairness.
Additionally, under section 2712 of the ECPA, any person affected
by a violation “may commence an action in United States District
Court against the United States to recover money damages.”114
Therefore, even though the Act may prevent citizens from bringing a
civil action against the telephone provider when law enforcement offi-
cials request disclosure in emergency situations, citizens are still af-
forded the opportunity to bring an action against the government.
Likewise, as previously stated, the Act does not apply to voluntary
disclosures by providers.115  Accordingly, in situations where a pro-
vider voluntary discloses locational information to a governmental en-
tity in violation of the ECPA, a citizen can bring a civil action against
that provider.  The purpose of the Kelsey Smith Act’s provision pro-
tecting providers from liability is not meant to frustrate Congress’s
intent to give citizens a right to civil action if their privacy rights are
violated.  Rather, it is a means of furthering Congress’s intent to pro-
vide law enforcement with a quick and efficient method to locate citi-
zens in times of emergency.
b. Is There Field Preemption Between the Kelsey Smith
Act and the ECPA?
Field preemption occurs when it is clear that Congress intended to
have a federal law occupy a particular area of law through a scheme of
federal regulation that is so pervasive as to reasonably conclude that
Congress left no room for the states to supplement it.116  The com-
plaint did not appear to claim that Congress left no room for the states
to supplement the ECPA.117  However, as a matter of policy, it would
be extremely difficult for Congress to establish field preemption in an
increasingly dynamic area such as electronic and telecommunication
privacy.  Advances in technology occur at such a rapid pace in our
society that it would nearly be impossible for Congress to keep up
with these changes and the effects they have on individual privacy
rights.  Thus, it is reasonable to assume that Congress anticipated
states would begin to supplement the ECPA as new technological ad-
vances arose.
114. 18 U.S.C. § 2712 (2002).
115. See H.B. 1108, 96th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2012).
116. Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 89 (1992).
117. See Hopwood Complaint, supra note 13.
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c. The Kelsey Smith Act Is Not Preempted by the ECPA
The Kelsey Smith Act will probably not be deemed unconstitutional
under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.  First,
the ECPA does not contain an express provision preempting state
laws that supplement the process of disclosing locational information
to requesting law enforcement officers in emergency situations.118
Second, the exception provided by section 2702 of the ECPA, requir-
ing providers to make a good faith evaluation before disclosing loca-
tional information to law enforcement, pertains to voluntary
disclosures—not to disclosures upon request; therefore, there does
not appear to be an actual conflict between the Kelsey Smith Act and
the ECPA.119  Third, the Kelsey Smith Act does not frustrate Con-
gress’s intent to provide a uniform standard for when and to whom
disclosures are made; nor does the Act attempt to frustrate Congress’s
intent to provide citizens with civil remedies in the occurrence of a
violation.120  Rather, the Act advances Congress’s intent to make loca-
tional information readily available in emergency situations through a
more efficient process.121  Finally, due to the ever-expansive field of
technology, it seems unreasonable to assume Congress intended to in-
clude every aspect of electronic communication privacy in the ECPA
so as to occupy the entire field and prevent the states from supple-
menting the Act.
2. Are There Other Constitutional Issues Raised by the
Kelsey Smith Act?
Despite the possibility that the Kelsey Smith Act is federally pre-
empted by the ECPA, some opponents of the Act may attempt to ar-
gue that the Kelsey Smith Act is unconstitutional under the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution; however, this claim is
without merit.  The Fourth Amendment establishes “the right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures.”122  Further, as discussed
above, there is still much debate as to whether the Fourth Amend-
ment applies to cell phone locational information as well as what pro-
cedural hurdles law enforcement officials must jump through to obtain
certain types of data under the ECPA.123
However, in regards to searches and seizures under the Fourth
Amendment not pertaining to cell phone data, the courts have ruled
that warrantless searches and seizures are nonetheless valid in emer-
118. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522, 2701–2712, 3121–3127.
119. Id. § 2702.
120. See H.B. 1108, 96th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2012).
121. Id.
122. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
123. See Wicker, supra note 19, at 91.
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gency situations.124  For example, in Mincey v. Arizona, the Court
stated that “the Fourth Amendment does not bar police officers from
making warrantless entries and searches when they reasonably believe
that a person within is in need of immediate aid.”125  Furthermore, in
regards to warrantless searches, the court in Wayne v. United States
stated, “The need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is
justification for what would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or
emergency.”126 Likewise, as previously discussed, it appears that Con-
gress intended to provide an exception to obtaining a warrant for cell
phone data in emergency situations in the ECPA.127  Thus, it follows
that regardless of whether or not the Fourth Amendment applies, the
Kelsey Smith Act will not be held unconstitutional when it deals solely
with obtaining locational information in emergency situations involv-
ing death or serious injury.
IV. BALANCING COMPETING VIEWS
Although it appears that the Kelsey Smith Act is constitutionally
valid, the question remains as to whether more states should adopt the
Act.  The primary goal in adopting legislation that allows law enforce-
ment officials to obtain locational cell phone information without a
warrant is to find a balance between the operational needs of law en-
forcement and individual expectations of privacy.128  For almost a dec-
ade, warrantless seizures of cell phone data have been the subject of
much debate.  Further, the debate has become increasingly more rele-
vant with the integration of “smart phones” into our daily lives.  To-
day, our cell phones contain extremely personal information including
website search histories, emails, pictures, text messages, and locational
information.  In addition, because cell phones commonly contain ex-
tremely intimate personal information, it is important that the pros
and cons of each piece of legislation regarding the seizure of these
devices are balanced carefully before adopting said legislation.
A. Proponents Views
Proponents of the Kelsey Smith Act believe that the Act provides
an effective and necessary tool for law enforcement officials to locate
missing persons in emergency situations.129  Prior to the enactment of
the Act, in states such as Kansas, Missouri, and Tennessee, law en-
forcement could obtain only a “ping” location on a victim’s cell phone
124. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 292 (1978).
125. Id.
126. Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
127. See 18 U.S.C. § 2702 (2002).
128. See Eric Lichtblau, Wireless Firms Are Flooded by Requests to Aid Surveil-
lance, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/09/us/cell-carriers-
see-uptick-in-requests-to-aid-surveillance.html?pagewanted=all.
129. See Browning, supra note 12.
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if the victim had initially called 911.130  The FCC governed these
“ping” locates through the E911 rules.131  Any other request would
require a warrant, which could often take days to obtain.132
E911 regulations require cellular service providers to provide cer-
tain minimum pieces of information to 911 operators to ensure that
the operator is able to locate the cell phone making the emergency
call.133  More specifically, the E911 rules require cellular service prov-
iders to give 911 operators “the location of 911 calls by longitude and
latitude,” which is normally determined using GPS technology.134
However, in emergency situations where no 911 calls are made, such
as in the abduction of Kelsey Smith, law enforcement officials were
required to obtain a warrant before seizing cell-site data from cellular
providers in compliance with the ECPA.135
Thus, proponents argue that the Kelsey Smith Act fills this void,
providing law enforcement with important locational information, in
the absence of a 911 call or a warrant, which could ultimately cut
down response time and save lives.136  In support of this argument,
proponents focus on the criticalness of the first hours of the abduc-
tion.  For example, in a 2006 Child Abduction Murder Study, the
Criminal Division of the Washington State Office of the Attorney
General reviewed over seven hundred cases and found that “in 76 per-
cent of the missing children homicide cases studied, the child was dead
within three hours of the abduction—and in 88.5 percent of the cases
the child was dead within twenty-four hours.”137  Therefore, propo-
nents believe the Act ultimately cuts down the response time in such
emergencies by providing law enforcement officials with the ability to
quickly retrieve extremely accurate locational information.
Additionally, proponents argue that cell-phone company employers
do not train their employees as to whether a particular situation con-
stitutes an emergency.  According to Overland Park, Kansas138 Police
Chief John Douglass, a cell-phone provider’s job is to make money,
whereas, law enforcement’s job is to protect and rescue people when
130. Kelsey Smith Act Would Help Locate Crime Victims Through Cell Phone Tech-
nology, TENNESSEE REPUBLICAN SENATE CAUCUS (Mar. 9, 2012), http://www.tn
senate.com/_blog/Newsroom/post/Kelsey_Smith_Act_would_help_locate_crime_
victims_through_cell_phone_technology/ [hereinafter TENNESSEE SENATE].
131. See 47 C.F.R. § 20.18 (2012).
132. TENNESSEE SENATE, supra note 130.
133. Id.
134. Id. § 20.18(f).
135. See TENNESSEE SENATE, supra note 130.
136. Corbin, supra note 8.
137. Criminal Division of the Washington State Office of the Attorney General,
2006 Child Abduction Murder Study, CHILD ABDUCTION MURDER RESEARCH, http://
www.atg.wa.gov/ChildAbductionResearch.aspx#.UQhknTk_5UQ (1993).
138. Overland Park, Kansas is the city where the abduction of Kelsey Smith oc-
curred on June 2, 2007.
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it is necessary.139  Thus, proponents ultimately argue that law enforce-
ment officials are more competent to make a determination of an
emergency situation than are cell-phone company employees, and the
Kelsey Smith Act properly places this discretion into law enforce-
ment’s hands.
B. Opponent Views
In contrast, opponents argue that the Act raises privacy concerns
under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and
that the Act prevents cell phone customers from filing suits against
cell-phone companies for making improper disclosures.140  However,
as discussed above, emergency situations generally constitute excep-
tions to obtaining a warrant under the Fourth Amendment.141  For ex-
ample, even privacy advocates such as the ACLU have stated that “in
certain emergency situations, for example to locate a missing person,
tracking a cell phone without a warrant is acceptable.”142  Nonethe-
less, opponents may be skeptical that enacting legislation such as the
Kelsey Smith Act will begin to pave the way for more and more war-
rantless searches and seizures of cell phone information and will
therefore create what is commonly referred to as a “slippery slope.”
In addition, the potential for abuse by law enforcement officials
raises concerns with many privacy advocates.143  According to an ac-
counting of responses by wireless carriers, Congressman Ed Markey
found state and local law enforcement agencies made more than 1.3
million requests of wireless carriers for the cell phone records of con-
sumers.144  Thus, based on the sheer volume of requests made by law
enforcement officials, it is easy to see the potential for abuse.  For
example, a law enforcement official could falsely claim to be acting in
response to an emergency to obtain valuable information about a
criminal suspect in the absence of a warrant.  Likewise, the account-
ings reported a large number of the requests made by law enforce-
ment official were for “cell tower dumps.”145  “Cell tower dumps”
139. Browning, supra note 12.
140. See Corbin, supra note 8; see also Hopwood Complaint, supra note 13.
141. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 292 (1978).
142. American Civil Liberties Union, Cell Phone Location Tracking Public Records
Request, PROTECTING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE DIGITAL AGE (Sept. 10, 2012), http://
www.aclu.org/protecting-civil-liberties-digital-age/cell-phone-location-tracking-public
-records-request.
143. See Eric Lictblau, Police Are Using Phone Tracking as a Routine Tool, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 31, 2012),  http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/01/us/police-tracking-of-cell
phones-raises-privacy-fears.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all.
144. Eric Lictblau, Wireless Firms are Flooded by Requests to Aid Surveillance,
N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/09/us/cell-carriers-see-
uptick-in-requests-to-aid-surveillance.html?pagewanted=all.
145. See David Kravets, Mobile-Phone Surveillance by Police Targets Millions An-
nually, WIRED (July, 9 2012), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/07/massive-
phone-surveillance/.
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occur when cell-phone carriers provide all the phone numbers of cell-
phone users that connect with a specific cell tower at a particular time,
including innocent people who are uninvolved with the crime or emer-
gency for which the request was made.146  Such practices raise privacy
concerns as to how law enforcement officials differentiate between the
records of innocent people and those that are subject to the investiga-
tion, as well as how they handle, administer, and dispose of the
information.147
C. More States Should Adopt the Kelsey Smith Act
As stated above, there must be a balance between the operational
needs of law enforcement and individual expectations of privacy.
Here, the Kelsey Smith Act seems to do a very good job of balancing
the two interests.  The law is narrowly tailored in furtherance of citi-
zen safety in emergency situations.  Additionally, the law successfully
fills a void that was not anticipated by Congress at the time the ECPA
was enacted.
However, the law should further define the process of obtaining and
later disposing of locational information.  That is, the procedural
methods should be specifically defined rather than merely stating that
carriers “shall provide call location information.”148  Doing so disman-
tles many of the privacy advocates’ concerns.  Ultimately, the Act ap-
pears to be constitutionally valid, and it appears to provide an
efficient manner by which law enforcement officials are able to obtain
important information in emergency situations.  Therefore, more
states should consider adopting the Kelsey Smith Act.
V. CONCLUSION
After careful review, it appears that the Kelsey Smith Act is consti-
tutionally valid.  First, the ECPA of 1986 does not appear to preempt
the Act.  That is, the Act does not create an obstacle to the accom-
plishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Con-
gress.  Therefore, the recent Missouri lawsuit is meritless.  Second, the
Act does not appear to violate the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution.  The courts generally acknowledge emergency sit-
uations as an exception to obtaining a warrant to conduct a search or
seizure under the Fourth Amendment.
Additionally, more states should probably adopt the Act as a means
of taking advantage of technological advancements to ensure the
safety of constituents.  For example, as stated above, when a person is
146. Jeffrey Brown, What Type of Process Is Required for a Cell Tower Dump?,
CYBERCRIME REVIEW (May 16, 2012), http://www.cybercrimereview.com/2012/05/
what-type-of-process-is-required-for.html.
147. See Kravets, supra note 145.
148. H.B. 1108, 96th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2012).
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abducted, the first hours are very critical to the successful recovery of
the abductee.  In the case of Kelsey Smith, her chances of survival
would most likely have been greater if the Act was in place at the time
of her abduction.  The Act ultimately gives law enforcement officials
the ability to determine whether a situation constitutes an emergency.
Thus, it makes more sense to give this burden to officials who deal
with emergency situations on a daily basis rather than cell phone carri-
ers who are in the business of making money, not saving lives.  How-
ever, states should be cautious in drafting similar legislation and
include the entire process associated with accessing the locational in-
formation in order to prevent infringement upon individual privacy
rights.  The impact of cell phone surveillance on users is becoming
increasingly important as the cellular platform continues to play a sig-
nificant role in social, economic, and political contexts.149  When ana-
lyzing the impact of a law that allows an exception to the probable
cause and warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution, as does the Kelsey Smith Act, the govern-
ment interests, such as crime prevention and officer safety, should al-
ways be balanced against individual privacy rights.  Legislators should
draft any legislation using cellular technology with extreme caution
because such technology is becoming more and more personally
invasive.
149. Wicker, supra note 19, at 98.
